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private keys and ciphertexts in their instantiation is linear in the length of user identity. In this paper, we
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model for TB-IBE. Subsequently, we show that a TB-IBE scheme satisfying some properties can be
converted to a full black-box A-IBE scheme, which is as efficient as the underlying TB-IBE scheme in terms
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ABSTRACT Accountable authority identity-based encryption (A-IBE), as an attractive way to guarantee
the user privacy security, enables a malicious private key generator (PKG) to be traced if it generates and
re-distributes a user private key. Particularly, an A-IBE scheme achieves full black-box security if it can
further trace a decoder box and is secure against a malicious PKG who can access the user decryption results.
In PKC’11, Sahai and Seyalioglu presented a generic construction for full black-box A-IBE from a primitive
called dummy identity-based encryption, which is a hybrid between IBE and attribute-based encryption
(ABE). However, as the complexity of ABE, their construction is inefficient and the size of private keys
and ciphertexts in their instantiation is linear in the length of user identity. In this paper, we present a new
efficient generic construction for full black-box A-IBE from a new primitive called token-based identitybased encryption (TB-IBE), without using ABE. We first formalize the definition and security model for
TB-IBE. Subsequently, we show that a TB-IBE scheme satisfying some properties can be converted to a full
black-box A-IBE scheme, which is as efficient as the underlying TB-IBE scheme in terms of computational
complexity and parameter sizes. Finally, we give an instantiation with the computational complexity as O(1)
and the constant size master key pair, private keys, and ciphertexts.
INDEX TERMS Accountable authority, full black-box security, identity-based encryption.
I. INTRODUCTION

Identity-based encryption (IBE), as an attractive primitive
which eliminates the necessity of certificate management in
the public key infrastructure, has drawn a lot of attention.
In an IBE scheme, the user public key is its identity and
the corresponding private key is generated by the private key
generator (PKG) using the user identity. A sender can send
an encrypted message to any receiver at any time and it only
needs to pre-know the identity of the receiver. This property
enables IBE useful in many practical applications, such as
email systems and intranets.
However, IBE suffers from an inherent problem, namely
the key escrow problem. Since the PKG has full control over
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Weizhi Meng.
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the user private key, it can engage in many malicious activities
without taking the risk of being caught, such as decrypting
any ciphertext or even generating and selling the user private
key. To illustrate it clear, we consider the following scenario.
Suppose Alice holds the only private key which can be used to
access a $100,000 worth of database belonging to Bob’s company. At a later point in time, Bob finds that a private key for
the database is up for sale. To protect the company’s benefit,
Bob then takes Alice to court and demands compensation for
potential economic loss. In such a case, Alice will pay a huge
indemnity if she cannot prove her innocence to the court.
To restrict the malicious activities of the PKG, Goyal [1]
proposed the concept of accountable authority identity-based
encryption (A-IBE), a variant of IBE which is equipped with
traceability functionality. In an A-IBE scheme, an additional

2169-3536 2019 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only.
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tracing algorithm is used for judging whether the PKG
or a suspected user who leaks a given private key. With
A-IBE system, Alice in the above case can show her innocence by providing valid and convincing evidence that the
private key is generated by the PKG. Furthermore, a secure
A-IBE scheme should satisfy three requirements as follows.
• It protects the message confidentiality.
• A dishonest PKG is unable to frame any user. That is,
the PKG cannot generate a private key which lets the
user be mistakenly identified as the creator.
• A dishonest user is unable to frame the PKG. That is,
the user cannot generate a private key which lets the
PKG be mistakenly identified as the creator.
A-IBE can be classified into white-box A-IBE and blackbox A-IBE. The white-box A-IBE can only trace the creator of
a private key, whereas the black-box A-IBE is able to trace the
creator of a decoder box, where a decoder box for a user can
decrypt the message encrypted to the user with an unknown
algorithm and unknown private key. In particular, the blackbox A-IBE can be classified into weak black-box A-IBE and
full black-box A-IBE, where the latter one is further secure
against the dishonest PKG who can access the user decryption
results. Note that the full black-box security is the strongest
security model among the following three models, i.e., whitebox security, weak black-box security, and full black-box
security.
The first full black-box A-IBE scheme was proposed by
Goyal et al. [2] in CCS 2008, which is a concrete construction and is selective-ID secure against dishonest users.
In PKC 2011, based on [2], Sahai and Seyalioglu [3] presented a generic construction of full black-box A-IBE from a
primitive called dummy identity-based encryption (D-IBE),
which is a hybrid between IBE and attribute-based encryption (ABE). The instantiation of their generic construction
achieves adaptive-ID dishonest user security. Without loss of
generality, in the following discussion, we refer A-IBE to full
black-box A-IBE unless specified otherwise.
Nevertheless, both of the proposed A-IBE schemes, [2], [3],
utilize ABE. As ABE is more complex than IBE in the
construction, we have that the existing A-IBE schemes are
less efficient than the IBE counterpart. For example, the size
of private keys and ciphertexts in both schemes are at least
linear in the length of the user identity, whereas that is
constant in IBE. Goyal et al. [2] even left an open problem
for constructing an A-IBE scheme with the constant size of
private keys and ciphertexts. So far, it remains unknown how
to construct an A-IBE (with full black box security) system
which is efficient as IBE schemes.
A. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS

Our contributions are three-fold and summarized as follows.
• We introduce a new primitive called token-based
identity-based encryption (TB-IBE), which is a variant
of IBE.
• Based on TB-IBE, we give a generic construction of
full black-box accountable identity-based encryption
VOLUME 7, 2019

(A-IBE) which is as efficient as the underlying
TB-IBE in terms of parameter sizes and computational
complexity.
• Finally, we give an instantiation of our generic construction based on Park-Lee IBE scheme [4], where
the instantiation achieves adaptive-ID dishonest user
security.
In a TB-IBE scheme, both the private key and the ciphertext
consist of an additional element called token. A user with
identity IDk can use its private key dID which is comprised
of a token tk to decrypt a ciphertext that is encrypted to
IDc and consists of a token tc if and only if IDk = IDc
and tk 6 = tc . In the security model of traditional IBE,
the adversary is not allowed to query the private key of
identity ID∗ to be challenged. In contrast, in the security
model of TB-IBE, the adversary can query the private key
of ID∗ with the restriction that the returned private key dID∗
has the same token as the generated challenge ciphertext
for ID∗ .
Then, we show that any TB-IBE scheme satisfying three
defined properties, namely Key-Well-Form, Cip-Well-Form,
and KG-Transfer, can be converted to a full black-box A-IBE
scheme following the generic construction. For an identity in
the converted A-IBE scheme, given any possible private key
(associated with a token tk ), there exist a negligible fraction
of valid ciphertexts (associated with a token tc ) that cannot be
decrypted by this key (tk = tc ). This is used for tracing in the
converted A-IBE scheme. Given a user private key dID and a
decoder box D, the creator of D can be traced by feeding it
with those ciphertexts which cannot be decrypted using dID .
If D returns the correct message, it is believed that the PKG
creates D. On the other hand, this is not helpful for the malicious PKG who is allowed to access decryption queries, since
the PKG can only find such a ciphertext with a negligible
probability.
To construct a full black-box A-IBE scheme based on
Park-Lee IBE scheme, we first show that Park-Lee IBE
scheme is a TB-IBE scheme and it is secure with a random oracle under the defined security model for TB-IBE.
Then, we demonstrate that Park-Lee IBE scheme satisfies
the required three properties such that it can be transferred
to a full black-box A-IBE scheme following our generic
construction. To show the efficiency of our instantiation,
we present the comparison with other existing full blackbox A-IBE schemes [2], [3] and the fundamental Park-Lee
IBE scheme [4] in Table. 1. As shown in Table. 1, the master public/secret key pair, private keys, and ciphertexts in
our scheme consist of the same constant number of group
elements as Park-Lee IBE scheme, whereas most of these
parameters are at least linear in the length of identity in [2]
and [3]. Besides this, the computation cost of encryption
and decryption of our construction is also constant, i.e., the
computational complexity is O(1), which is comparable to
Park-Lee IBE scheme and more efficient than that of [2]
and [3].
25937
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TABLE 1. Comparison of parameter sizes and computation cost.

B. RELATED WORK

The notion of Accountable Authority Identity-Based Encryption (A-IBE) was first introduced by Goyal in [1], where
the two proposed schemes achieve white-box security and
weak black-box security, respectively. Later, Goyal et al. [2]
proposed the first full black-box A-IBE scheme with security
against dishonest users in the selective model. Libert and
Vergnaud [5] proposed a weak black-box A-IBE scheme with
the constant size of private keys and ciphertexts. A generic
construction of A-IBE with full black-box security was presented by Sahai and Seyalioglu in [3], using a primitive called
dummy IBE. They enhanced Goyal et al.s’ scheme [2] and
put forward the first adaptive-ID secure A-IBE scheme in
the full black-box model. Kiayias and Tang [6] presented
a generic construction, showing how to transfer any IBE
scheme to a weak black-box A-IBE scheme.
A-IBE with additional functionalities was studied
in [6]–[8]. Au et al. [7] extended the white-box A-IBE
scheme with retrievability, which means the master secret
key of the PKG can be retrieved if more than one private key
for a user is created. The public traceability of A-IBE was
considered in [8] where the tracing can be performed with a
public key. The authors gave a weak black-box A-IBE scheme
with public traceability. The generic construction presented
in [6] was extended to support identity reuse.
Accountability in attribute-based encryption (ABE) was
introduced in [9] including accountable authority and a new
feature called user accountability. ABE with user accountability enables tracing a given private key or decoder box
to its creator among numerous suspected users, where the
authority is assumed to be fully trusted. Whereas in accountable authority ABE, it is necessary to further distinguish
the PKG from the user as the creator since the authority is
assumed to be semi-trusted. ABE schemes supporting user
accountability were studied in [10]–[13]. ABE schemes with
user accountable authority and user accountability were given
in [14]–[16], where [14] and [15] consider the white-box
security and [16] considers the black-box security. However,
the black-box security in A-ABE only refers to the weak
black-box security in A-IBE.
The defined notion of token-based identity-based encryption can be traced back to the dual system encryption for
IBE introduced by Waters in [17], where both the private key
and the ciphertext contain a tag, and one ciphertext cannot
25938

be decrypted by a private key if their tags are identical. The
tags were created in order to obtain the adaptive security.
We note that the dual system encryption with tags cannot be
applied as a building block for our generic construction since
we cannot check whether the ciphertext is well-formed or not.
IBE schemes with tags were also studied in [4], [18], and [19]
for adaptive security.
C. ORGANIZATION

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we recall the definitions and security models of full blackbox A-IBE schemes. In Section III, we propose an efficient generic construction of full black-box A-IBE scheme
along with its security proof based on a new primitive,
namely token-based identity-based encryption. In Section IV,
we describe a concrete scheme of our generic construction.
Finally, we conclude this paper in Section V.
II. FULL BLACK-BOX ACCOUNTABLE AUTHORITY IBE

In this section, we review the formal definitions and
security models for full black-box accountable authority
identity-based encryption (A-IBE).
A. DEFINITIONS

An A-IBE scheme is a variant of IBE and it is able to distinguish the PKG from the user as the creator of a given -useful
decoder box D for ID (defined in Definition 1). In traditional
IBE, the user private key is completely generated by the
PKG. But, in A-IBE, the private key generation process is
performed by the PKG and the user together via running
a key generation protocol to achieve the traceability. More
precisely, an A-IBE scheme comprises five algorithms as
follows.
• Setup (1λ ). Taking as input a security parameter λ,
the setup algorithm outputs a master public/secret key
pair (mpk, msk).
• KeyGenPro (mpk, msk, ID). This is a protocol in which
a user U interacts with the PKG to obtain a private key
dID for an identity ID.
– Inputs:
PKG takes as input (mpk, msk) and ID;
U takes as input mpk and ID.
– Outputs:
U receives a private key dID as its secret output.
VOLUME 7, 2019
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Encrypt (mpk, ID, M ). Taking as input mpk, ID, and a
message M , the encrypt algorithm outputs a ciphertext
CT for (ID, M ).
• Decrypt (mpk, dID , CT ). Taking as input mpk, a ciphertext CT , and a private key dID for ID, the decrypt algorithm outputs M or ⊥.
• Trace (mpk, dID , D). Taking as input mpk, a ‘‘wellformed’’ private key dID for ID,1 and an -useful decoder
box D for ID, the trace algorithm outputs PKG or U
according to that D is generated by PKG or U.
Correctness. The correctness of an A-IBE scheme requires
that for any (mpk, msk) ← Setup(1λ ) and dID ←
KeyGenPro(mpk, msk, ID), we have that
•

Decrypt(mpk, dID , Encrypt(mpk, ID, M )) = M .
Definition 1 (-Useful
Decoder Box [3]): For nonnegligible , a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm D is
an -useful decoder box for the identity ID if:
Pr[M ← D(Encrypt(mpk, ID, M ))] ≥ .
B. SECURITY MODELS

A secure A-IBE scheme is required to satisfy three security
requirements. First, it should capture the message confidentiality as IBE schemes. Next, it should guarantee that in the
tracing algorithm, the user cannot be framed by the PKG.
Then, the guarantee should also be applied to ensure that the
PKG cannot be framed by the user. We define the security
models of an A-IBE scheme to capture its security via the following three games, i.e., IND-ID-CPA game, Dishonest PKG
game, and dishonest user game, which are played between a
challenger C and an adversary A.
1) IND-ID-CPA GAME

The IND-ID-CPA security of an A-IBE scheme is similar to
that in the IBE scheme except for the key generation process.
Setup. C runs the setup algorithm Setup to generate a
master key pair (mpk, msk) and sends mpk to A.
Phase 1. In this phase, A is allowed to make private key
queries on adaptively chosen identities. For a queried identity
ID, A interacts with C to run the key generation protocol
KeyGenPro to generate the corresponding private key dID .
Note that A will obtain the same private key for the same
queried ID.
Challenge. Once A decides that Phase 1 is over, it submits
two different messages M0∗ , M1∗ from the message space and
an identity ID∗ for challenge with the restriction that ID∗ was
not queried in Phase 1. C then picks a random bit µ ∈ {0, 1},
runs the encrypt algorithm Encrypt to generate the challenge
ciphertext CT ∗ with (ID∗ , Mµ∗ ), and sends CT ∗ to A.
Phase 2. In this phase, A is allowed to issue more private
key queries on the identity ID with the restriction that ID 6 =
ID∗ . C responds to A the same as Phase 1.
1 The ‘‘well-formed’’ here means that the private key d
ID is a probable

output of the key generation protocol KeyGenPro for ID.
VOLUME 7, 2019

Guess. Finally, A outputs its guess µ0 of µ and wins the
game if µ0 = µ.
The advantage of A in winning this game is defined as
AdvIND-ID-CPA (λ) = Pr[µ0 = µ] − 1/2 .
A

If A is allowed to make decryption queries on the ciphertext
CT encrypted with ID in Phase 1 and Phase 2 with the
restriction that CT 6 = CT ∗ if CT is generated with ID∗ , then
we have the IND-ID-CCA game.
2) DISHONEST PKG GAME

In the dishonest PKG security, C acts as an honest user and
A acts as a malicious PKG who tries to output an -useful
decoder box D∗ for ID∗ and frames U.
Setup. C receives the master public key mpk and a challenge identity ID∗ from A.
KeyGen. C interacts with A to run the key generation
protocol KeyGenPro to generate the corresponding private
key dID∗ for ID∗ . If neither party aborts, C receives dID∗ as its
secret output.
Query. In this phase, A is allowed to make decryption
queries on adaptively chosen ciphertexts CT , C runs the
decrypt algorithm Decrypt to obtain the decryption M /⊥ and
sends it to A.
Frame. Finally, A outputs an -useful decoder box D∗
for the identity ID∗ and wins the game if Trace(mpk, dID∗ ,
D∗ ) = U .
We define Pr[Trace(mpk, dID∗ , D∗ ) = U ] as the advantage
of A in winning this game.
3) DISHONEST USER GAME

In the dishonest user security, C acts as an honest PKG and
A acts as a malicious user U who tries to output an -useful
decoder box D∗ for ID∗ and frames PKG.
Setup. C runs the setup algorithm Setup to generate a
master key pair (mpk, msk) and sends mpk to A.
KeyGen. In this phase, A is allowed to make private key
queries on adaptively chosen identities. For a queried identity
ID, A interacts with C to run the key generation protocol
KeyGenPro to generate the corresponding private key dID .
Frame. Finally, A outputs a private key dID∗ for ID∗ and
an -useful decoder box D∗ for ID∗ and wins the game if
Trace(mpk, dID∗ , D∗ ) = PKG.
We define Pr[Trace(mpk, dID∗ , D∗ ) = PKG] as the advantage of A in winning this game. If A is required to declare
the challenge identity ID∗ before the setup phase, we have
the selective-ID dishonest user security.
Definition 2 (Security of A-IBE): A full black-box
accountable authority identity-based encryption scheme is
secure if all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the IND-ID-CPA Game, the Dishonest
PKG Game, and the Dishonest User Game.
III. GENERIC CONSTRUCTION FROM TOKEN-BASED IBE

In this section, we give a generic construction of full blackbox accountable authority identity-based encryption from a
25939
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new primitive called token-based identity-based encryption
(TB-IBE).
A. TOKEN-BASED IBE

We first formalize the definition and the security model
of a new primitive, token-based identity-based encryption
(TB-IBE). In a TB-IBE scheme, the private key and the
ciphertext contain an additional element called token. The private key of an identity ID can decrypt a ciphertext encrypted
to ID only when their tokens are different. More precisely,
a TB-IBE scheme consists of four algorithms below.
• T.Setup(1λ ). Taking as input a security parameter λ, it outputs a master public/secret key pair
(T .mpk, T .msk).
• T.KeyGen(T .mpk, T .msk, ID, tk ). Taking as input
(T .mpk, T .msk), an identity ID, and a token tk , it generates the output private key T .dID , where T .dID naturally
contains tk .
• T.Encrypt(T .mpk, ID, M , tc ). Taking as input T .mpk,
an identity ID, a message M , and a token tc , it generates the output ciphertext T .CT , where T .CT naturally
contains tc .
• T.Decrypt(T .mpk, T .dID , T .CT ). Taking as input
T .mpk, a private key T .dID created with (ID, tk ), and
a ciphertext T .CT , it outputs a message M or ⊥.
Correctness. The correctness of a TB-IBE scheme requires
that for any (T .mpk, T .msk) ← T.Setup(1λ ) and T .dID ←
T.KeyGen(T .mpk, T .msk, ID, tk ), we have that
T.Decrypt(T .mpk, T .dID , T.Encrypt(T .mpk, ID, M , tc ))
(
M if tk 6 = tc
=
⊥ otherwise.
Since not all the ciphertexts encrypted to ID can be
decrypted by the private key generated for ID in a TB-IBE
scheme, it is possible to generate a private key such that
some known ciphertexts cannot be decrypted with it. With
this property, we can generate the private key of the challenge
identity in the security model with the restriction that it cannot
decrypt the challenge ciphertext. Then, we define a new
security model of TB-IBE to captures the indistinguishable
security against chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-tID-CPA) by
the following game played between a challenger C and an
adversary A.
1) IND-TID-CPA GAME

The IND-tID-CPA security of a TB-IBE scheme is defined as
follows.
Setup. C runs the setup algorithm T.Setup to generate a
master key pair (T .mpk, T .msk) and sends T .mpk to A.
Phase 1. In this phase, A is allowed to make private key
queries on adaptively chosen identities. For a queried identity
ID, C randomly chooses a token tk , runs the key generation
algorithm T.KeyGen to generate the corresponding private
key T .dID , and sends it to A. For the same queried identity,
C responds to A with the same private key.
25940

Challenge. Once A decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs
two different messages M0∗ , M1∗ from the message space and
an identity ID∗ for challenge, where ID∗ can be one of the
queried identities in Phase 1. C responds as follows.
• If ID∗ was not queried in Phase 1, C picks a random
bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and a random token tc∗ , runs the encrypt
algorithm T.Encrypt to generate the challenge ciphertext T .CT ∗ with (ID∗ , Mµ∗ , tc∗ ), and sends it to A.
• Otherwise, ID∗ was queried in Phase 1. Let T .dID∗
associate with the token tk be the corresponding private
key. C picks a random bit µ ∈ {0, 1}, sets tc∗ = tk , and
runs the encrypt algorithm T.Encrypt to generate the
challenge ciphertext T .CT ∗ with (ID∗ , Mµ∗ , tc∗ ). It then
sends T .CT ∗ to A.
Phase 2. In this phase, A is allowed to issue more private
key queries on adaptively chosen identities which can contain
ID∗ . For a queried identity ID, C responds as follows.
• If ID = ID∗ and ID∗ was not queried before, C sets
tk∗ = tc∗ , runs the key generation algorithm T.KeyGen
to generate the corresponding private key T .dID∗ with
(ID∗ , tk∗ ), and sends it to A.
• Otherwise, C responds to A the same as Phase 1.
Guess. Finally, A outputs its guess µ0 of µ and wins the
game if µ0 = µ.
The advantage of A in winning this game is defined as
IND-tID-CPA
AdvA
(λ) = Pr[µ0 = µ] − 1/2 .

It is easy to see that IND-tID-CPA security covers IND-IDCPA security. Additionally, if A is allowed to make decryption queries in Phase 1 and Phase 2, we have the indistinguishable security against chosen-ciphertext attacks of a TB-IBE
scheme (IND-tID-CCA).
Definition 3 (Security of TB-IBE): A token-based identitybased encryption scheme is IND-tID-CPA secure if
IND-tID-CPA
AdvA
(λ) is negligible.
B. GENERIC CONSTRUCTION

Then we show that a TB-IBE scheme can be converted to an
A-IBE scheme if it satisfies the following three properties,
i.e., Key-Well-Form, Cip-Well-Form, and Key-Transfer. Furthermore, the converted A-IBE scheme is comparable to the
underlying TB-IBE scheme in terms of parameter sizes and
computational complexity.
• (Key-Well-Form). Let KS be the private key range
of T.KeyGen(T .mpk, T .msk, ID, tk ) for a given identity
ID and any token tk . There exists a key sanity check
algorithm as follows.
T.KCheck(T .mpk, T .dID ): taking as input T .mpk
and a private key T .dID for ID, it outputs 1 if T .dID
is well-formed, i.e.
T .dID ∈ KS.
Otherwise, it outputs 0.

VOLUME 7, 2019
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•

(Cip-Well-Form). Let CS be the ciphertext range of
T.Encrypt(T .mpk, ID, M , tc ) for a given identity ID,
a given message M , and any token tc . There exists a
ciphertext sanity check algorithm as follows.
T.CCheck(T .mpk, T .CT ): taking as input T .mpk
and a ciphertext T .CT created with (ID, M ), it outputs 1 if T .CT is well-formed, i.e.
T .CT ∈ CS.
Otherwise, it outputs 0.

•

(KG-Transfer). There exists a secure key generation
protocol in which a user U with identity ID interacts with
the PKG to obtain its corresponding private key.
T.KeyGenPro(T .mpk, T .msk, ID):
– Inputs:
PKG takes as input (T .mpk, T .msk) and ID;
U takes as input T .mpk and ID;
– Outputs:
U receives a private key T .dID created with
(ID, tk ), if 1 ← T.KCheck(T .mpk, T .dID ),
U receives T .dID as its secret output.

Note that the token tk is hidden in the key generation
protocol such that the PKG cannot control the user private key. Furthermore, the security of the key generation
protocol requires that the following KG-Replace and
KG-Anonymity holds.
– (KG-Replace). Replacing the key generation algorithm T.KeyGen with the key generation protocol
T.KeyGenPro, the TB-IBE scheme is still INDtID-CPA secure.
– (KG-Anonymity). PKG has negligible probability
in guessing the token tk in the user private key
T .dID .
Using the original three algorithms of TB-IBE, i.e.,
T.Setup, T.Encrypt, and T.Decrypt, the transferred A-IBE
scheme replaces T.KeyGen with T.KeyGenPro and adds a
new trace algorithm called Trace.
Generic Construction. We give a generic construction of
an A-IBE scheme below.
• Setup(1λ ). Taking as input the security parameter λ,
it runs T.Setup(1λ ) to generate the master public/secret
key pair (T .mpk, T .msk) and sets the output master key
pair as (mpk, msk) = (T .mpk, T .msk).
• KenGenPro(mpk, msk, ID). For an identity ID, U interacts with the PKG to run the key generation protocol
T.KeyGenPro(T .mpk, T .msk, ID) and obtain a corresponding well-formed private key T .dID created with tk .
U sets its private key as dID = T .dID .
• Encrypt(mpk, ID, M , tc ). Taking as input mpk, an identity ID, a message M , and a token tc , it runs
T.Encrypt(T .mpk, ID, M , tc ) to generate a corresponding ciphertext T .CT with (ID, M , tc ) and sets the output
ciphertext as CT = T .CT .
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•

•

Decrypt(mpk, dID , CT ). Taking as input mpk, a private
key dID created with (ID, tk ), and a ciphertext CT ,
it aborts if T.CCheck(T .mpk, T .CT ) returns 0. Otherwise, it runs T.Decrypt(T .mpk, T .dID , T .CT ) to obtain
the return decryption M /⊥ and sets the output as the
return decryption.
Trace(mpk, dID , D). Taking as input mpk, a private key
dID created with (ID, tk ), and an -useful decoder box D
for the same identity ID, it aborts if T.KCheck (T .mpk,
T .dID ) returns 0. Otherwise, the trace algorithm performs as follows.
a. Initialize a counter ctr ← 0 and repeat the next
steps L = λ/ times.
1) Set tc = tk and randomly choose a message
M , run Encrypt(mpk, ID, M , tc ) to generate a
ciphertext CT with (ID, M , tc ).
2) Feed the decoder box D with CT . If D outputs
M 0 such that M 0 = M , increment ctr.
b. If ctr = 0, it outputs U. Otherwise, it outputs PKG.

In the trace algorithm, the private key dID created with the
token tk cannot decrypt the ciphertext CT created with the
token tc since tk = tc . Then, if D is generated with the input
private key dID , it cannot correctly decrypt the ciphertext CT .
Let the message space be M whose size is exponential in
the size of security parameter, the probability that D correctly
guesses the message is 1/|M| which is negligible. Then, if D
can decrypt the ciphertext correctly, PKG is suspected to be
the creator of D.
More specifically, from the generic construction, the converted A-IBE scheme has the same master key pair, private
keys, and ciphertexts as the underlying TB-IBE scheme.
Furthermore, the encryption process of the converted A-IBE
scheme is just the same as the underlying TB-IBE scheme
while the decryption process adds an additional ciphertext
sanity check which costs constant operations (since the
ciphertext size is constant). This leads to an A-IBE scheme
which is as efficient as the TB-IBE scheme in terms of parameter sizes (master key pair, private keys, and ciphertexts) and
computational complexity (encryption and decryption).
C. SECURITY ANALYSIS

Finally, we give the security analysis of our generic
construction.
Theorem 1: The constructed A-IBE scheme is secure
when the underlying TB-IBE scheme satisfies the three properties, i.e. Key-Well-Form, Cip-Well-Form, and KG-Transfer.
Proof: According to Definition 2, an A-IBE scheme
is secure if the advantages of an adversary in winning the
IND-ID-CPA game, dishonest PKG game, and dishonest user
game are all negligible. We give the proof for these three
securities in Lemma 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
Lemma 1 (IND-ID-CPA): The advantage of an adversary
in winning the IND-ID-CPA Game for the constructed A-IBE
is negligible.
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Proof: In the IND-tID-CPA game of the constructed
A-IBE scheme, the adversary A interacts with the challenger
C as follows.
Setup. C runs Setup to generate a master key pair
(mpk, msk) and sends mpk to A.
Phase 1. A issues adaptive private key queries. For a
queried identity ID, C interacts with A to run KeyGenPro
and lets A obtain the corresponding private key dID created
with a token tk . Note that for the same ID, C guarantees that
A will obtain the same private key.
Challenge. Once A decides that Phase 1 is over, it submits
two different messages M0∗ , M1∗ from the message space and
an identity ID∗ for challenge.
• If ID∗ was not queried in Phase 1, C picks a random
bit µ ∈ {0, 1} and randomly chooses a token tc∗ , runs
Encrypt to generate the challenge ciphertext CT ∗ with
(Mµ∗ , tc∗ ), and sends CT ∗ to A.
• Otherwise, ID∗ was queried in Phase 1. Let the corresponding private key be dID∗ associated with a token tk∗ .
C sets the token tc∗ = tk∗ , picks a random bit µ ∈ {0, 1},
and runs Encrypt to generate the challenge ciphertext
CT ∗ with (Mµ∗ , tc∗ ). C then sends CT ∗ to A.
Phase 2. A issues more private key queries. For a query on
ID, C responds as follows.
If ID = ID∗ and ID∗ was not queried before, C interacts
with A to run KeyGenPro and lets A obtain the corresponding private key dID∗ associated with tk∗ , where
tk∗ = tc∗ .
• Otherwise, C responds to A the same as Phase 1.
Guess. Finally, A outputs its guess µ0 of µ and wins the
game if µ0 = µ.
It is easy to see that the only difference in the IND-tIDCPA game between the constructed A-IBE scheme and the
underlying TB-IBE scheme is the key generation process,
where that is a protocol KeyGenPro in the A-IBE scheme
but an algorithm T.KeyGen instead in the TB-IBE scheme.
As the KG-Replace security, the TB-IBE scheme is still
IND-tID-CPA secure when the key generation algorithm
T.KeyGen is replaced with the key generation protocol T.KeyGenPro. Since KeyGenPro is the same as
T.KeyGenPro, it follows easily that the A-IBE scheme is
IND-tID-CPA secure. Then, we have that the A-IBE scheme
is IND-ID-CPA secure since the IND-tID-CPA security covers the IND-ID-CPA security (see subsection III-A).
Lemma 2 (Dishonest PKG Security): The advantage of an
adversary in winning the Dishonest PKG Game for the constructed A-IBE scheme is negligible.
Proof: In the dishonest PKG game of the constructed
A-IBE scheme, the adversary A interacts with the challenger
C as follows.
Setup. A sends mpk and the challenge identity ID∗ to C.
C aborts if mpk and ID∗ are not well-formed.
KeyGen. C interacts with A to run KeyGenPro to generate
a well-formed corresponding private key dID∗ associated with
a token tk∗ for ID∗ . C sets dID∗ as its secret output.
•
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Query. A can make decryption queries on adaptively chosen ciphertexts. For a queried ciphertext CT associated with
the token tc , C runs T.CCheck on CT and aborts if it returns 0.
Otherwise, C runs Decrypt on CT and sends the output
M /⊥ to A.
Frame. A outputs an -useful decoder box D for ID∗ and
wins the game if Trace(mpk, dID∗ , D∗ ) = U .
If A wins this game, we have Trace(mpk, dID∗ , D∗ ) = U .
Which means that in the trace algorithm Trace, ctr = 0 at
last. Below, we analyze that if the -useful decoder box D is
generated by PKG, the probability of ctr = 0 is negligible.
First, we show that the malicious PKG A can extract the
token tk∗ with negligible probability. In the KeyGen phase,
as the KG-Anonymity security, A has negligible probability
in guessing tk∗ in dID∗ . In the Query phase, A makes decryption queries on adaptively chosen ciphertexts. Since C will
first run the ciphertext sanity check on the queried ciphertext
and aborts if the check fails, only well-formed ciphertexts
can be accepted to be decrypted. As the decryption of a
well-formed ciphertext using well-formed private keys will
lead to the same result, A can extract tk∗ with negligible
probability.
Then, since the PKG can only extract the token tk with
negligible probability, the probability that an iteration in the
trace algorithm keeps ctr unchanged is at most 1 − . As the
-useful decoder box D is assumed to be stateless, we have
Pr[ctr = 0] ≤ (1 − )L ≈ exp(−L)
= exp(− · λ/) = exp(−λ),
which is negligible. Therefore, the advantage of an adversary
in winning this game is negligible.
Lemma 3 (Dishonest User Security): The advantage of an
adversary in winning the Dishonest User Game for the constructed A-IBE scheme is negligible.
Proof: From Lemma 1, we have that the A-IBE scheme
is IND-tID-CPA secure. Next, we give the proof that the
IND-tID-CPA security of the A-IBE scheme implies its dishonest user security.
Assume an adversary A can break the dishonest user security of the A-IBE scheme. We use A to construct another
adversary B to break the IND-tID-CPA security of the A-IBE
scheme as follows.
Setup. The challenger runs the setup algorithm Setup to
generate a master key pair (mpk, msk). Then B is given mpk
and gives it to A.
Phase 1. A makes adaptively private key queries. For a
query on ID, A interacts with B, B interacts with the challenger to run the key generation protocol KeyGenPro to
generate a well-formed corresponding private key dID with
(ID, tk ) by sending sends everything received from A to the
challenger and everything received from the challenger to A.
Finally, A receives dID as its private key.
Challenge. B receives a private key dID∗ associated with
(ID∗ , tk∗ ) and an -useful decoder box D∗ for ID∗ from
A. B then sends two different messages M0∗ , M1∗ from the
VOLUME 7, 2019

Z. Zhao et al.: Efficient Construction for Full Black-Box Accountable A-IBE

message space and the identity ID∗ to the challenger. Since
ID∗ has been queried, the challenger chooses a random bit
µ ∈ {0, 1}, sets the token tc∗ = tk∗ , and runs Encrypt to
generate the challenge ciphertext CT ∗ with (ID∗ , Mµ∗ , tc∗ ).
The challenger gives CT ∗ to B.
Phase 2. This phase can be omitted since B has obtained
the decoder box D∗ for the challenge identity ID∗ .
Guess. Since A wins the dishonest user game, we have
Trace(mpk, dID∗ , D∗ ) = PKG. Which means that taking as
input a ciphertext CT encrypted with a token tk∗ , the decoder
box D will output M 0 such that M 0 = M at least in one
iteration, where tk∗ is the token of the input private key dID∗ .
B feeds CT ∗ to D, D will output Mµ∗ with the probability
1/L as CT ∗ is associated with the token tk∗ . Since L = λ/
is a polynomial number, we have that D∗ will output Mµ∗
with non-negligible probability. B then checks Mµ∗ = M0∗
or Mµ∗ = M1∗ , if the former one holds, B outputs its guess
as µ = 0. Otherwise, if the latter one holds, B outputs its
guess as µ0 = 1. The advantage of adversary in guessing µ
correctly is non-negligible.
Therefore, if an adversary can break the dishonest user
security of an A-IBE scheme, the adversary will break
its IND-tID-CPA security with non-negligible probability.
As the A-IBE scheme is IND-tID-CPA secure, it is dishonest
user secure as well.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
IV. A CONCRETE SCHEME

In this section, we give an instantiation of the proposed
generic construction based on Park-Lee IBE scheme [4].
In particular, our instantiation achieves adaptive-ID dishonest
user security.
Let G and GT be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime
order p. Let g be a generator of G and e be a bilinear map,
e : G × G → GT . If e(ua , vb ) = e(u, v)ab holds for all u, v ∈
G, a, b ∈ Zp and e(g, g) 6 = 1. We say that G is a bilinear
group if the group operation in G and the bilinear map e :
G×G → GT are both efficiently computable. Notice that the
map e is symmetric since e(ga , gb ) = e(g, g)ab = e(gb , ga ).
Let PG = (G, GT , g, p, e) be the pairing group consists of
the objects defined above.
A. PARK-LEE IBE SCHEME

We first show that Park-Lee IBE scheme is a TB-IBE scheme.
B. SECURITY PROOF

We now prove that the Park-Lee IBE scheme is
IND-tID-CPA secure under the DBDH assumption (suppose a, b, c, z ∈ Zp are randomly chosen numbers,
no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm can distinguish the tuple (g, ga , gb , gc , e(g, g)abc ) from the tuple
(g, ga , gb , gc , e(g, g)z ) with non-negligible advantage).
Note that the IND-tID-CPA security proof of the Park-Lee
IBE scheme allows the private key query on the challenge identity ID∗ . This leads to two more new problems
in the security proof of IND-tID-CPA compared to that of
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IND-ID-CPA. One is how to simulate the challenge ciphertext CT ∗ if ID∗ was queried in Phase 1. The other one is how
to simulate the private key of ID∗ in Phase 2 if it was not
queried in Phase 1. The core idea of these two simulations is
that let the token tk∗ included in the private key of ID∗ be as the
same as the token tc∗ included in the challenge ciphertext CT ∗ .
Theorem 2: Suppose the hash function H is a random
oracle. The Park-Lee IBE scheme is an IND-tID-CPA secure
TB-IBE scheme under the DBDH assumption.
Proof: Suppose there exists an adversary A who can
ε-break the Park-Lee IBE scheme in the IND-tID-CPA security model. We construct a simulator B to solve the
 DBDH
problem. Given a problem instance g, ga , gb , gc , Z over the
pairing group PG, B runs A and works as below.
Setup. B sets the master pubic key as T .mpk = (PG, g1 =
ga , g2 = gb ), where α is implicitly set as a. Let the hash
function H be a random oracle.
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H-Query. In this phase, A makes hash queries to the
random oracle H on adaptively chosen identities. B sets a
hash list L to record the respond tuple (ID, t, x, h), where
the list is initially empty. For a query on ID, if ID has been
recorded in the L of a tuple (ID, t, x, h), B returns h to A.
Otherwise, B randomly chooses t, x ∈ Zp , and computes

Pr[µ0 = µ|Z = e(g, g)abc ] − Pr[µ0 = µ|Z 6 = e(g, g)abc ]

x
h = H (ID) = g−t
2 g .

Then, B sends h to A and adds the tuple (ID, t, x, h) to the
hash list L.
Phase 1. In this phase, A is allowed to adaptively issue
private key queries. For a query on ID, let the corresponding
hash tuple kept in L be (ID, t, x, h). B randomly chooses r 0 ∈
Zp , implicitly sets r = −a + r 0 and let tk = t, then computes
the private key T .dID = (d1 , d2 , d3 , d4 ) as
= (gb )r ,
d1 = gα+r
= ga−a+r
2
2
0

0

0

0

d2 = gr = g−a+r = (ga )−1 gr ,
d4 = tk = t,
d3 = H (ID)gt2

r

x t
= g−t
2 g g2

−a+r 0

using Z , which is random and unknown in the view of A.
In this case, the probability of A in guessing the encrypted
message correctly is | Pr[µ0 = µ]|Z 6 = e(g, g)abc | = 1/2.
Then, the advantage of B in solving the DBDH problem is

0

= (ga )−x gx·r .

It is easy to see that T .dID is a well-formed private key for ID.
Then, B sends the private key T .dID = (d1 , d2 , d3 , d4 ) to A.
Challenge. Once A decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs
two different messages M0∗ , M1∗ ∈ GT and a challenge identity ID∗ , where ID∗ could be one of the queried identities in
Phase 1. In particular, no matter whether the queried identity
is ID∗ or not, the simulation for the challenge ciphertext
T .CT ∗ is as follows. let (ID∗ , t ∗ , x ∗ , h∗ ) be the corresponding
hash tuple in the L of ID∗ . B randomly picks a bit µ ∈ {0, 1},
sets the token tc∗ = t ∗ , and computes the challenge ciphertext
T .CT ∗ = (C1∗ , C2∗ , C3∗ , C4∗ ) as


 ∗ ∗ ∗ c
x ∗
t∗ s
x t
C1∗ = (H (ID∗ )g2c = g−t
= gc ,
2 g g2

= |1/2 + ε − 1/2|
= ε.

This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
C. THREE PROPERTIES

Finally, we show that Park-Lee IBE scheme satisfies the
required three properties, and hence, it can be converted to
a secure A-IBE scheme following the generic construction.
First, we give the following two algorithms and one protocol,
i.e., a key sanity check algorithm T.KCheck, a ciphertext
sanity check algorithm T.CCheck, and a key generation
protocol T.KeyGenPro.

C2∗ = gs = gc ,
C3∗ = tc∗ = t ∗ ,
C4∗ = Mµ∗ · Z = Mµ∗ · e(g, g)abc .
It is easy to see T .CT ∗ is a well-formed ciphertext for ID. B
then returns T .CT ∗ to A.
Phase 2. In this phase, A is allowed to make more private
key queries. B responds as in Phase 1. Note that the private
key for ID∗ can be queried in this phase. If ID∗ was not
queried in Phase 1, B sets tk = tc∗ = t ∗ and generate the corre∗ with the hash tuple (ID∗ , t ∗ , x ∗ , h∗ ).
sponding private key dID
The key generation is the same as Phase 1.
Guess. A outputs its guess µ0 of µ. B outputs 1 if µ0 = µ.
Otherwise, B outputs 0.
Next, we analyze the advantage of B in solving the DBDH
problem as follows. If Z = e(g, g)abc is true, the simulation
is indistinguishable from the real attack. According to the
assumption that A can ε-break the scheme, we have the
probability of A in guessing the encrypted message correctly
to be | Pr[µ0 = µ|Z = e(g, g)abc ]| = 1/2 + ε. If Z
is random, T .CT ∗ is a one-time pad since M is encrypted
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In the key generation protocol T.KeyGenPro, the
user U interacts with the PKG with the zero-knowledge
proof described as below. In the proof, U possesses
(H (ID), g2 , k̄, t̄, R) and the PKG possesses (H (ID), g2 , R).
U wants to convince the PKG that R is computed with k̄, t̄ as
R = H (ID)k̄ gt̄2 without leaking the secret of k̄, t̄. The security
of this zero-knowledge proof is referred to [20].
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Let the hash tuple of ID in L be (ID, t, x, h). In the
IND-tID-CPA security proof of the Park-Lee IBE scheme,
the simulator acting as the PKG sets tk = t to generate the corresponding private key with (ID, tk ). After being
replaced with the key generation protocol, the user and the
PKG engage in a key generation protocol where tk should
be jointly determined by both of them (via t̄ and t 0 ). In the
corresponding security proof, the simulator acting as the PKG
only needs to generate a partial private key for the queried ID.
Then, if the simulator can successfully simulate the partial
private key, we can have the KG-Replace be proved. The
simulator B performs as follows to simulate the partial private
key for ID.
• Receiving R = H (ID)k̄ gt̄2 = hk̄ gt̄2 from the adversary A, the simulator B interacts with A to run the
zero-knowledge proof and aborts if the proof fails. Otherwise, B randomly chooses r̃ ∈ Zp , implicitly sets
r 0 = −a+ r̃ and let tk = t, then computes a well-formed
private key as the simulation of private keys in
IND-tID-CPA security proof for the Park-Lee IBE
scheme:


0
0
0
T[
.dID = (db1 , db2 , db3 , db4 ) = gα+r
, gr , (hgt2k )r , tk .
2
B then rewinds A to obtain (k̄ and t̄) [1]. It then com0 as follows and sends
putes the partial private key T .dID
it to A.

0
T .dID
= d10 , d20 , d30 , d40


k̄
= db1 , db2 , db3 , db4 · k̄ − t̄




tk r 0 k̄
α+r 0 r 0
= g2 , g , (hg2 )
, tk · k̄ − t̄


0
tk k̄−t̄ r 0
r0
k̄ t̄
,
g
,
(h
g
·
g
)
,
t
·
k̄
−
t̄
= gα+r
k
2
2
2


tk k̄−t̄ r 0
α+r 0 r 0
= g2 , g , (R · g2
) , tk · k̄ − t̄
Let t 0 = tk · k̄ − t̄, we have


0
0
r0
t0 r0 0
T .dID
= gα+r
,
g
.
,
(R
·
g
)
,
t
2
2

Next, we prove that the constructed key generation protocol is secure, i.e, it satisfies KG-Replace and KG-Anonymity
securities.
Theorem 3: The key generation protocol T.KeyGenPro is
secure.
Proof: As a secure T.KeyGenPro requires the
KG-Replace security and the KG-Anonymity security,
we prove these two in Lemma 4 and 5, respectively.
Lemma 4 (KG-Replace Security): The key generation
protocol T.KeyGenPro satisfies the KG-Replace security.
Proof: How to issue a private key dID for an identity ID is the only difference in the IND-tID-CPA security
proof before and after replacing the key generation algorithm
T.KeyGen with the key generation protocol T.KeyGenPro.
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Therefore, the key generation protocol can be successfully
simulated. The key generation protocol T.KeyGenPro satisfies the KG-Replace security.
Lemma 5 (KG-Anonymity Security): The key generation
protocol T.KeyGenPro satisfies the KG-Anonymity security.
Proof: In the key generation protocol T.KeyGenPro,
U finally obtains a private key T .dID created with (ID, tk ),
where the token tk is computed by t̄, k̄, and t 0 . As t̄ and
k̄ are protected by the zero-knowledge proof, we have that
PKG obtain zero knowledge about tk . Since the token space is
Zp , PKG has negligible probability in guessing tk . Therefore,
the KG-Anonymity security is satisfied.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
With the constructed two algorithms and one protocol
above, this completes the proof that the Park-Lee IBE
scheme satisfies the Key-Well-Form, Cip-Well-Form, and
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KG-Transfer properties. Following Theorem 1, we have that
Park-Lee IBE scheme can be converted to an A-IBE scheme
which is IND-ID-CPA secure, dishonest PKG secure, and
dishonest user secure. Moreover, we can apply the technique developed in [21] to our construction to obtain an
IND-ID-CCA secure A-IBE scheme under a random oracle
model.
Following the generic construction, the transferred A-IBE
scheme using Park-Lee IBE scheme has the same parameter sizes and computational complexity as Park-Lee IBE
scheme. Therefore, we can obtain an A-IBE scheme with the
constant size master public/secret key pair, private keys, and
ciphertexts. Moreover, the computation cost for encryption
and decryption in our A-IBE scheme is also constant. The
specific size and cost are analyzed as shown in Table 1.
V. CONCLUSION

We proposed a generic construction for full black-box
accountable authority identity-based encryption (A-IBE).
In comparison with the existing generic constructions which
apply the complex and inefficient ABE, our generic construction eliminates the ABE and is built from a variant IBE called
token-based identity-based encryption (TB-IBE) with three
defined properties, i.e., Key-Well-Form, Cip-Well-Form, and
KG-Transfer. We proved that Park-Lee IBE scheme is a
secure TB-IBE in the IND-tID-CPA security model defined in
this work. Subsequently, we constructed a key sanity check,
a ciphertext sanity check, and a secure key generation protocol for Park-Lee IBE scheme to prove that it satisfies the
required three properties, and hence, it can be transferred to a
full black-box A-IBE scheme. This instantiation is comparable to Park-Lee IBE scheme and more efficient than the
existing full black-box A-IBE schemes in terms of parameter
sizes (i.e. constant size master public/secret key, private keys,
and ciphertexts) and computational complexity (i.e. constant
computational complexity for encryption and decryption).
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